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This paper explains and explores the concept of “semantic molecules” in the NSM 
methodology of semantic analysis. A semantic molecule is a complex lexical 
meaning which functions as an intermediate unit in the structure of other, more 
complex concepts. The paper undertakes an overview of different kinds of semantic 
molecule, showing how they enter into more complex meanings and how they 
themselves can be explicated. It shows that four levels of “nesting” of molecules 
within molecules are attested, and it argues that while some molecules, such as 
‘hands’ and ‘make’, may well be language-universal, many others are language-
specific.  
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1. Semantic primes: the “atoms” of meaning 
 
As is well-known, the Natural Semantic Metalanguage (NSM) is a decomposi-
tional approach to semantics based on language-internal reductive paraphrase 
(Wierzbicka 1996; Goddard & Wierzbicka 2002; Goddard 2006). The key theo-
retical concept is that of semantic primes, i.e. elementary lexical meanings which 
cannot be further paraphrased in simpler terms. After a long program of empiri-
cal/analytical research—from Wierzbicka (1972), through Goddard and 
Wierzbicka eds (1994, 2002), and continuing—NSM researchers claim with some 
confidence to have identified 65 universal semantic primes. Semantic primes are 
the bedrock of linguistic meaning: the terminal elements of semantic analysis in 
any language.  
 A substantial and growing body of evidence indicates that these elementary 
meanings are lexicalised in all languages, i.e. that all languages possess concrete 
exponents (words, bound morphemes or phrasemes) which can be used to express 
the same inventory of primes. Semantic primes have an inherent syntax which 
also appears to be universal, in the sense that it manifests itself, albeit with formal 
variations, in all languages. One can therefore think of semantic primes and their 
associated grammar as the intersection of all languages. 
 The current inventory of primes (Wierzbicka 2006a, in press; Goddard 2007) is 
given in the Appendix, using English and Japanese exponents. Detailed “whole 
metalanguage” studies of Spanish, Chinese, Malay, Polish, Mbula, and Lao can be 
found in Goddard and Wierzbicka (eds, 2002). For similar studies of French, Ital-
ian, Portuguese, and Spanish, see Peeters (ed., 2006), and for Amharic, East Cree 
and Korean, see Goddard (ed., in press). A comprehensive bibliography of NSM 
publications can be accessed at: [www.une.edu.au/arts/LCL/nsm/index. htm]. 
 
 
2. Semantic molecules 
 
It is well established that lexical items in many semantic domains (emotion terms, 
speech-act verbs, value terms, discourse particles, and “abstract” vocabulary in 
general) can be decomposed directly into semantic primes (cf. Wierzbicka 1992, 
1996, and other works). It is equally apparent, however, that words of many kinds 
resist decomposition in one go, as it were, directly into semantic primes. For ex-
ample, plausible explications for words like cat, mouse and horse must begin with 
the component ‘animals [M] of one kind’, and plausible explications for oak, elm, 
and pine must begin with the component ‘trees [M] of one kind’ (molecules are 
marked with [M] in explications). The concepts of ‘animals’ and ‘trees’ are them-
selves complex and further decomposable, but they function as units in the 
explications of many other concepts. By the term semantic molecule, then, we 
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understand a complex lexical meaning which functions as a semantic unit (or 
“chunk”) in the structure of other, more complex concepts.1 
 To develop an idea of the role, range and nature of semantic molecules in the 
English lexicon, it is useful to consider several explications which have been de-
veloped independently of these questions. In this, we are following the normal 
NSM practice of trying to induce generalisations about semantic structure from 
empirical work. For reasons of space, we will have to confine ourselves to partial 
explications. Explication [A] below is a partial explication for a natural kind 
term—cats (Wierzbicka 1985; Goddard 1998). It follows the semantic template 
for natural kind terms: (a) category within the taxonomic hierarchy, (b) habitat, 
(c) size, (d) appearance, (e) behaviour, (f) relation with people.  
 Running through the four sections presented here, we see that section (a) in-
cludes a taxonomic “life form” category, ‘animals [M]’, as a semantic molecule. 
Section (b) gets by without any additional semantic molecules: it is phrased almost 
exclusively in semantic primes.2 Regarding section (c), the “size” section, Wierz-
bicka (1985) has argued that anthropocentrism pervades human construal of the 
physical world, and, in particular, that the human body furnishes a reference point 
for judgements of relative size. In the case of cats, this component depends on the 
potential to pick up a cat with two hands, with both ‘pick up [M]’ (a physical ac-
tion verb) and ‘hands [M]’ (a body-part word) functioning as semantic molecules. 
The subsequent “appearance” section contains numerous molecules: yet more 
body-part terms (‘head’, ‘ears’, ‘eyes’, ‘mouth’, ‘tail’, ‘feet’),3 and terms of two 
additional kinds: shape descriptors (‘round’, ‘long’, ‘pointed’), and physical quali-
ties (‘soft’, ‘sharp’).  
 
[A] A partial explication for cats 
a.  animals [M] of one kind CATEGORY 
b.  animals [M] of this kind live with people  HABITAT  
  sometimes they live in places where people live 
  sometimes they live near places where people live 
c.  they are not big SIZE  
  a person can pick up [M] one with two hands [M] 
                                                
1 The Moscow School of semantics (Mel’cuk and colleagues) has long championed the need for 
intermediate-level decomposition (Apresjan 2000), but without the constraint that intermediate-
level concepts exist as meanings of ordinary lexical items in the language concerned.  
2 Cats being “domestic” animals, the habitat component makes reference to them living with peo-
ple or near where people live; and PEOPLE is a semantic prime. The comparable component for 
some other natural kinds may well require semantic molecules; for example, whales and tuna 
presumably ‘live in the sea [M]’. 
3 The word ‘have’ which appears in the explications in association with body-parts, e.g. ‘they have 
soft [M] fur [M]’ is not the NSM prime HAVE, but a morphosyntactic realisation of the prime PART 
(HAVE PARTS). 
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d.  they have soft [M] fur [M]  APPEARANCE 
  they have a round [M] head [M] 
  they have pointed [M] ears [M]  
  their ears [M] are on two sides of the top [M] part of the head [M] 
  their eyes [M] are not like people’s eyes [M]  
  they have some long [M] hairs [M] near the mouth [M], on two sides of the mouth [M] 
  they have a long [M] tail [M] 
  they have soft [M] feet [M]  
  they have small sharp [M] claws [M] 
 
 Just as explication [A] can serve as an exemplar of natural kind terms, so ex-
plication [B] for chairs can stand as a (partial) exemplar of artefact terms 
(Goddard 2007). The top-level component contains a prolific semantic molecule: 
‘make [M]’. Any artefact term designates things which exist ‘because people make 
[M] them’. The semantic template for artefact terms continues with a “purpose” 
section specifying people’s motivation for making such things. In the case of 
chairs, this obviously involves ‘sitting’; roughly speaking, chairs are things of the 
kind people make so as to be able to sit comfortably while doing things. To cap-
ture this notion, it is not necessary to employ ‘comfortably’ as a semantic 
molecule, because the required meaning can be rendered directly in semantic 
primes, as shown in the final line of [B]. What is necessary, however, is to employ 
‘sit [M]’ as a semantic molecule, because the explication of ‘sit’ is much too com-
plex (cf. Wierzbicka 2006b) to be substitutable directly into [B].  
 
[B] A partial explication for chairs 
a.  things of one kind CATEGORY 
  things of this kind exist because people make [M] them 
b.  people make [M] them because they want them to be in places where people live PURPOSE 
  they want this because they want people to be able to sit [M] on them 
   when they have to do something somewhere for some time 
  people want people to be able to sit [M] on them at these times 
   because they don’t want them to feel something bad in their bodies 
 
 Other bodily activity verbs such as ‘eat’ and ‘drink’ are also known to be pro-
lific semantic molecules. They are needed in words for artefacts such as spoon, 
plate, cup, and bottle, for food and drink words such as meat, bread, tea and cof-
fee, and in many other contexts. It is not possible for reasons of space to discuss 
the structure of bodily activity verbs in any detail, but it is obvious that they call 
for the use of body-part terms as semantic molecules; for example, to explicate 
eat and drink one must include the molecule ‘mouth’. 
 [C] and [D] below are partial explications for two complex physical activity 
verbs: English cutting and chopping (Goddard & Wierzbicka to appear a). Verbs 
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of this kind follow the semantic template: (a) lexico-syntactic frame, (b) proto-
typical motivation, (c) instrument, (d) manner, (e) what happens to the object, (f) 
potential outcome. The shared top-level component, the lexico-syntactic frame, 
can be phrased without recourse to semantic molecules. It characterises both verbs 
as activities by which a person produces some effect upon an object in a con-
trolled fashion by means of an instrument.  
 Comparing the next two sets of components in their respective explications, 
certain key differences between cutting and chopping start to become apparent. 
The prototypical motivation in both cases includes the wish that ‘this something 
not be one thing anymore’ (i.e. the intent to create some kind of “separation” or 
“division”). Yet in the case of chopping it is specified that this motivation applies 
to a prototypical object which is ‘something hard [M]’, whereas with cutting there 
is no corresponding characterisation of the prototypical object. Continuing down 
the prototypical motivation component for cutting, it reads: ‘I want this something 
to be two things, I want these two things to have straight [M] edges [M]’. The 
word ‘straight’ is another example of a shape descriptor, but ‘edges’ represents a 
different kind of molecule from those we have previously observed. It can be 
termed an “ethnogeometrical concept” (Brotherson in press). The same molecule 
is found later in the “instrument” section of both explications: cutting and chop-
ping require an instrument with a ‘sharp [M] edge [M]’.  
 
[C] A partial explication for cutting: 
  Someone X was cutting something Y (e.g. some paper, a cake) with something Z 
a.  someone X was doing something to thing Y with thing Z  
   for some time LEXICO-SYNTACTIC FRAME 
  because of this, at the same time something was happening to thing Y 
   as this someone wanted 
b.  this someone was doing it as people do when they do something  
   to something PROTOTYPICAL MOTIVATION 
  because a short time before they thought about this something like this:  
   “I want this something not to be one thing anymore 
    I want this something to be two things 
    I want these two things to have straight [M] edges [M]”  
c.  when someone does something like this because they think like this, INSTRUMENT 
   they do it with something  
  this something is not a part of this someone’s body 
  this something has a sharp [M] edge [M] 
 
[D] A partial explication for chopping: 
  Someone X was chopping something Y (e.g. some wood) with something Z 
a.  someone X was doing something to thing Y with thing Z  
   for some time  LEXICO-SYNTACTIC FRAME 
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  because of this, at the same time something was happening to thing Y 
   as this someone wanted 
b.  this someone was doing it as people do when they do PROTOTYPICAL MOTIVATION 
   something to something hard [M] 
  because a short time before they thought about this something like this:  
   “I want this something not to be one thing anymore 
    I want this one big thing to be many small things” 
c.   when someone does something like this because they think like this,  INSTRUMENT 
   they do it with something  
  this something is not a part of this someone’s body 
  it has two parts 
  one of these two parts has a sharp [M] edge [M] 
  the other part is a long [M] part 
 
 I have to emphasise that my focus is not on the validity or descriptive adequacy 
of these explications, but on their structure. No doubt numerous questions and ob-
jections have occurred to readers on matters of detail, which it would be 
impossible to anticipate and respond to here. The point of the exposition in this 
section has been to illustrate the role of semantic molecules in different kinds of 
explications, and to establish that certain particular kinds of molecules appear to 
be common: body-parts, shape descriptors, physical qualities, ethnogeometrical 
terms, and bodily actions. Before moving to other issues about semantic mol-
ecules, a matter of clarification should be attended to. 
 
 
3. Recurrent “non-molecular” components 
 
There are many recurrent components across the lexicon which are not semantic 
molecules, in the sense under discussion here, because they are not “encapsu-
lated” as the meanings of surface lexical items. For example, many nouns begin 
with top-level categorical components such as: ‘one part of someone’s body’ (for 
body-part terms), ‘living things of one kind’ (for natural kind terms), ‘a place of 
one kind where people live’ (for words like town, city, village, etc). Likewise, 
many verbs contain high-level components related to semantic role or argument 
structure; for example: ‘someone did something’, ‘someone did something to 
something/someone else’, ‘someone did something to something with something’, 
‘something happened to something else because of it’, and so. Many verbs also 
contain a component like ‘this someone did this because this someone wanted to 
do it’, corresponding to the technical notion of volitional action.  
 To take one further example, from a smaller segment of the lexicon, emotion 
adjectives such as sad, annoyed and homesick, conform to a semantic template 
which begins: ‘someone feels something (good/bad), as people feel when they 
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think like this: – – ’ (followed by a prototypical cognitive scenario setting out cer-
tain characteristic thoughts and wants).  
 Such recurrent but “non-molecular” components can be extremely significant for 
the interface between lexical and grammatical semantics, and for the creation of 
lexical classes; but they are simple enough in their internal semantic structure to be 
spelt out in relatively short strings composed purely of semantic primes. They are 
not semantic molecules, because they are not the meanings of surface lexical items.  
 
 
4. Numbers and kinds of semantic molecules  
 
How many productive semantic molecules are there? At this formative stage of 
research, the answer is not very clear. Wierzbicka (in press) has hazarded an esti-
mate (for English and Polish) of 100–200.  
 It is known that productive molecules are drawn from at least nine categories. 
The first six have already been briefly exemplified: (i) parts of the body, such as 
‘hands’, ‘mouth’, ‘legs’, (ii) physical activities, such as ‘eat’, ‘drink’, ‘sit’, (iii) the 
verb ‘make’, (iv) shape descriptors, such as ‘long’, ‘round’, ‘flat’, (v) physical 
qualities, such as ‘hard’, ‘sharp’, and ‘straight’ (vi) ethnogeometrical terms, such 
as ‘edges’ and ‘ends’, and (vi) taxonomic concepts, such as ‘animal’, ‘bird’, and 
‘tree’. To this list one can add at least three further categories: (vii) macro-terms 
from the natural environment, such as ‘ground’, ‘sky’, and ‘sun’, (viii) “elemental” 
concepts (for want of a better term), such as ‘water’ and ‘fire’, and (ix) basic 
social categories, i.e. kinds of people, such as ‘men’, ‘women’, and ‘children’. 
 Only the briefest justifications can be given here for the latter items. ‘Ground’ 
is needed (among other things) for explications of walking and running, for nu-
merous geographical concepts, and for certain dimensional concepts, such as tall 
(Wong, Goddard & Wierzbicka to appear; Wierzbicka 2006a). ‘Sky’ is needed for 
words like sun, moon, stars, and clouds, and for the colour blue; and ‘sun’ for the 
explication of day, the colour yellow, and for warm (Goddard & Wierzbicka in 
press). ‘Water’ is needed in the explication of words like rain, river, sea, swim, 
float, wash, pour, wet, and dry; and ‘fire’ is needed for hot, burn, smoke, ashes, 
and for the colour red. ‘Men’ and ‘women’ are needed for kin and stage-of-life 
nouns like father, mother, boy and girl, for nouns designating gender-specific 
items of clothing, such as dress and bra, and body-parts such as breast, penis and 
beard (Goddard & Wierzbicka to appear b). ‘Children’ is needed for words like 
baby, adult, mummy, daddy, toy, doll, school, play (in one of its senses; Alexander 
2006), and innocent.  
 
 
5. Explications for some semantic molecules 
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This section presents a selection of explications for semantic molecules of several 
kinds. The relevance is two-fold: first, to show how some common semantic mol-
ecules can themselves be explicated; second, to establish some facts about the 
“nesting” of molecule within molecule.  
 A useful starting point is parts of the body (Wierzbicka 2007). Consider the 
word head (in the sense of a person’s head).4 As explicated in [D], it requires in 
its explication not only semantic primes establishing its parthood relationship with 
the body (‘one part of someone’s body’, etc.) and position (‘above all the other 
parts of this someone’s body’), but also an indication of its shape—in the form of 
the semantic molecule ‘round’. The meaning ‘head’ in turn functions as a mol-
ecule in certain other body-part meanings, such as eyes (shown in [E]), ears, and 
hair, among others. 
[D] head1 (someone’s head) 
a.  one part of someone’s body 
b.  this part is above all the other parts of this someone’s body 
c.  this part is round [M] 
 
[E] eyes (someone’s eyes) 
a.  two parts of someone’s body 
b.  they are on one side of this someone’s head [M] 
c.  because people’s bodies have these parts, people can see 
 
 Shape descriptors are needed in many other body-part concepts too. For exam-
ple, the concept of legs requires the descriptor ‘long’, as shown in [F]. ‘Legs’ in 
turn is a molecule in verbs like walk and run, among others. 
 
[F] legs (someone’s legs) 
a.  two parts of someone‘s body 
b.  these two parts are below all the other parts of this someone’s body 
c.  these two parts are long [M] 
d.  these two parts of someone’s body can move as this someone wants 
e.  because people’s bodies have these parts, people can move in many places as they want 
 
 Already we can discern several levels of semantic nesting: shape descriptors 
(like ‘long’ and ‘round’) are molecules inside body-part concepts (like ‘legs’ and 
                                                
4 Body-parts of other kinds of living things require distinct but related explications, i.e. words like 
head, legs, and so on are polysemous between a primary sense based on the human body, and a 
secondary sense applying to other species by analogy with the human body. For example, the head2  of 
an animal or a snake can be explicated as follows: ‘one part of the body of a living thing of one kind 
(e.g. cow, snake); this part is like one part of people’s bodies; this part of people’s body’s is the 
head1’. 
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‘head’); and body-part concepts in turn are molecules inside bodily action verbs 
(like ‘run’ and ‘eat’). But what about the semantics of shape descriptors? 
 Wierzbicka (2003, 2006a, 2007) has investigated these in depth, and has drawn 
a remarkable conclusion: that shape concepts depend in part on the concept of 
‘hands’.5 The nub of the argument is that shape concepts designate properties 
which can be detected not only visually, but also by “touch”—i.e. by the touch of 
our hands. This aspect is crucial to capturing the tangibility and physicality of 
shape concepts (as compared with colour concepts, for example, which depend 
purely on seeing). A sample explication is given in [G].6 
[G] something long (e.g. a tail, a stick, a cucumber) 
a.  when someone sees this thing, this someone can think about it like this:  
b.   “two parts of this thing are not like any other parts,  
    because one of these two parts is very far from the other” 
c.  if someone’s hands [M] touch this thing everywhere on all sides,  
   this someone can think about it in the same way 
 
 It might seem at this point that we are facing a fatal circularity. How can shape 
descriptors depend on a body-part concept, namely ‘hands’, while at the same 
time body-part concepts depend on shape descriptors? In fact, there is no circu-
larity on account of another remarkable result (Wierzbicka 2003, 2006a, 2007). 
Of all the body-part concepts, it seems that ‘hands’ alone can be explicated purely 
in terms of semantic primes, without recourse to any shape (or other) semantic 
molecules. The explication for ‘hands’ is shown in [H].  
 
[H] hands (someone’s hands) 
a.  two parts of someone’s body 
b.  they are on two sides of this someone’s body 
c.  these two parts of someone’s body can move as this someone wants 
d.  these two parts of someone’s body have many parts 
e.  if this someone wants it, all the parts on one side of one of these two parts can touch  
   all the parts on one side of the other at the same time 
f.  because people’s bodies have these two parts, people can do many things with many things  
   as they want 
                                                
5 Some physical quality concepts (Goddard and Wierzbicka in press) also depend on the concept 
of ‘hands’. For example, the concept of physical ‘hardness’ depends on the idea that if someone 
wants to “make an impact” on something hard (e.g., to break, deform, or scratch it), they cannot do 
this with the hands alone: they have to use some kind of instrument.  
6 Wierzbicka (2006b) argues that the nearest Polish word podłużny ‘elongated, oblong’ differs 
slightly but discernibly from English long in component (b): podłużny requires only that two parts 
can be construed as ‘far’ apart (not necessarily as ‘very far’ apart). The difference accounts for 
differences in the range of use of the two words; a matchbox or a paperback book, for example, 
could be described as podłużny, but not as long. 
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g.  because people’s bodies have these two parts, people can touch many things as they want 
 
Wierzbicka (2003) argues that the foundational status of the concept of ‘hands’ 
makes sense from the point of view of an embodied concept of cognition. 
“[H]uman hands”, she argues, “mediate, to a large extent, between the world and 
the human mind”, because of the crucial role played by “handling” things and by 
touching things in an exploratory way with the hands. Equally, the hands are our 
principal “bodily instruments” for making things, for using things, and for doing 
things of many other kinds. It makes a lot of sense, therefore, that the concept of 
‘hands’ is a foundational semantic molecule in so many human concepts. 
 
 
6. Conclusions 
 
Before summarising our conclusions, it may be worthwhile to reiterate that se-
mantic molecules cannot be postulated ad hoc, but are subject to strict constraints. 
These include, first and foremost, a demonstration that any postulated molecule 
can be explicated without circularity down to the level of semantic primes. As we 
have just seen, this may involve working through several levels of semantic nest-
ing, but it is crucial to be sure that no implicit circularity is introduced into the 
system by the addition of any given semantic molecule. Second, semantic mole-
cules must exist as the meanings of lexical units in the language. Originally this 
constraint was motivated by cognitive considerations, i.e. by the notion that exist-
ing word-meanings have a prima facie claim to cognitive reality and are not 
simply inventions of the analyst. From another point of view, the lexicalisation 
constraint means that semantic molecules do not add any additional complexity to 
the overall semantic system, in the sense that the meanings which function as 
molecules are a sub-set of the lexical meanings already present in the language. 
Third, semantic molecules are only to be introduced when they are needed, i.e. 
when it emerges from the analytical process that the required semantic content 
cannot be represented directly in an intelligible fashion using semantic primes. In 
this connection, it is well to recall that many divisions of the lexicon can be expli-
cated entirely without semantic molecules; for example, the lexical domains of 
emotion tems, speech-act verbs, and value terminology. The finding that semantic 
molecules are necessary in some domains is an empirical finding, not a matter of 
analytical convenience. 
 To return to the main theme of the present paper, we can conclude that there 
are as many as four levels of semantic nesting within highly complex concepts, 
such as those for natural kinds and artefacts. In the explication for cats or chairs, 
for example, the most complex molecules are bodily action verbs like ‘eat [M]’ or 
‘sit [M]’. They contain body-part molecules such as ‘mouth [M]’ and ‘legs [M]’. 
These in turn contain shape descriptors, such as ‘long [M], ‘round [M]’, and ‘flat 
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[M]’, and they in turn harbour the molecule ‘hands [M]’, composed purely of se-
mantic primes. A further level of nesting occurs when natural kind terms 
themselves function as semantic molecules at a shallow level of semantic struc-
ture. For example, words for unfamiliar species such as tigers and zebras contain 
a “likeness” reference to familiar natural kinds, such as ‘cats’ and ‘horses’, re-
spectively; endonymic terms like purr and saddle also contain references to ‘cats’ 
and ‘horses’, respectively (Goddard 1998).  
 It seems likely on current evidence that some semantic molecules are universal. 
This applies to concepts which are foundational for many other concepts and/or for 
large lexical classes. The molecule ‘hands’ is a prime candidate, and cross-linguistic 
surveys appear to support this position, once sufficient attention is focused on ques-
tions of language-specific polysemy (Goddard 2001; Wierzbicka 2007). The same 
can be argued for ‘make’, given the universality of artefact concepts in the lexi-
cons of all languages. Other candidates for universal semantic molecules are 
certain other body-parts such as ‘eyes’ and ‘ears’ (Wierzbicka 2007), basic social 
categories like ‘men’ and ‘women’ (Goddard & Wierzbicka to appear a), and per-
haps the sociobiological concept ‘mother’, given the foundational status of the 
mother-child relationship in kinship systems (Wierzbicka 1992).  
 It is also clear that some semantic molecules are language-specific. This is only 
to be expected in the case of taxonomic categories: it is well established that there 
are languages which lack exact equivalents for words like ‘animal’, ‘bird’ and 
‘tree’ (cf. Goddard 2001). Likewise, it is not too surprising that some languages 
employ particular concepts as semantic molecules while others do not. For exam-
ple, in Polish the word grzyb ‘mushroom’ functions as a semantic molecule: there 
are many common Polish words for kinds of grzyby ‘mushrooms’, and various 
endonymic words which include ‘grzyb [M]’ in their meanings. Perhaps more sur-
prising is the claim that lower-level molecules such as shape descriptors and ethno-
geometrical terms can also vary somewhat from language to language, but as 
mentioned in Note 6, Wierzbicka (2006a, in press) argues that English ‘long [M]’ 
does not exactly match the comparable Polish molecule ‘podłużny [M]’ ‘elongated, 
oblong’; and Brotherson (in press) argues that English ‘ends [M]’ differs from its 
nearest counterpart ‘tapu [M]’ in Makasai (East Timor). Wierzbicka (2006b) has 
argued that in English ‘colour’ functions as a semantic molecule in words like red, 
blue, green, etc., while many other languages lack “colour words” in the true sense, 
because their visual descriptor words do not involve any comparable molecule. 
 It should be clear that the concept of semantic molecules is an extremely fertile 
one, with multiple ramifications for our understanding of the overall structuring of 
the lexicon, for lexical typology, for language acquisition, and for language and 
cognition studies. In coming decades we can expect semantic molecules to be one 
of the most vibrant research fronts in semantics. 
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Appendix 
Table 1: Semantic primes—English exponents 
Substantives:   I, YOU, SOMEONE, SOMETHING/THING, PEOPLE, BODY 
Relational substantives: KIND, PART 
Determiners:   THIS, THE SAME, OTHER/ELSE 
Quantifiers:   ONE, TWO, MUCH/MANY, SOME, ALL 
Evaluators:   GOOD, BAD 
Descriptors:   BIG, SMALL 
Mental predicates:  THINK, KNOW, WANT, FEEL, SEE, HEAR 
Speech:  SAY, WORDS, TRUE 
Action, events,  
movement, contact: DO, HAPPEN, MOVE, TOUCH 
Location, existence,  
possession, specification: 
BE (SOMEWHERE), THERE IS/EXIST, HAVE, BE (SOMEONE/  
SOMETHING) 
Life and death:  LIVE, DIE 
Time:  WHEN/TIME, NOW, BEFORE, AFTER, A LONG TIME, A SHORT TIME, 
FOR SOME TIME, MOMENT 
Space:  WHERE/PLACE, HERE, ABOVE, BELOW, FAR, NEAR, SIDE, INSIDE 
Logical concepts: NOT, MAYBE, CAN, BECAUSE, IF 
Augmentor, intensifier: VERY, MORE 
Similarity:   LIKE/AS 
Table 2: Semantic primes—Japanese exponents 
WATASHI I, ANATA you, DAREKA someone, NANIKA/MONO/KOTO something/thing, 
HITO/HITOBITO people, KARADA body 
SHURUI kind, BUBUN part 
KORE this, ONAJI the same, HOKA other 
HITO-/ICHI- one, FUTA-/NI- two, TAKUSAN much/many, IKUTSUKA some, MINNA all 
II good, WARUI bad 
OOKII big, CHIISAI small 
OMOU think, SHIRU know, HOSHII/-TAI/NOZOMU want, KANJIRU feel, MIRU see, KIKU hear 
IU say, KOTOBA words, HONTOO true 
SURU do, OKORU/OKIRU happen, UGOKU move, FURERU touch 
(DOKOKA) IRU/ARU be (somewhere), IRU/ARU there is, MOTSU have, (DAREKA/NANIKA) 
DEARU be (someone/something) 
IKIRU live, SHINU die 
ITSU/TOKI when/time, IMA now, MAE before, ATO after, NAGAI AIDA a long time, MIJIKAI 
AIDA a short time, SHIBARAKU NO AIDA for some time, SUGUNI moment/in one moment 
DOKO/TOKORO where/place, KOKO here, UE above, SHITA below, CHIKAI near, TOOI far, 
MEN side, NAKA inside 
-NAI not, TABUN maybe, DEKIRU can, -KARA because, MOSHI (BA) if 
SUGOKU very, MOTTO more 
YOO/YOONI like/as 
Notes: • Primes exist as the meanings of lexical units (not at the level of lexemes) • Exponents of 
primes may be words, bound morphemes, or phrasemes • They can be formally complex • They 
can have different morphosyntactic properties, including word-class, in different languages • They 
can have combinatorial variants (allolexes) • Each prime has well-specified syntactic (combina-
torial) properties. 
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